ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION 2. ELLIPTIC CURVES
The vast majority of the products and standarts that use public-key cryptography for encryption and digital signatures use RSA. The bit length for secure RSA usage has increased over recent years, and this has put a heavier precessing load on applications using RSA. This burden has ramifications, especially for electronic commerce sites that conduct large numbers of secure transactions. Recently, a competing system has begun to challenge RSA: elliptic curve cryptography(ECC). In the mid-1980s, Miller and Koblitz introduced elliptic curves into cryptography [1] , and Lenstra showed how to use elliptic curves to factor integers. Since that time, elliptic curves have played an increasingly important role in many cryptographic situations.
One of the advantages is that they seem to offer a level of security comparable to classical cryptosystems that use much larger key sizes. Already, ECC is showing up in standardization efforts, including the IEEE P1363 Standard for Public -Key Cryptography [1, 2] .
An Elliptic Curve E is the graph of an equation E: y 2 = x 3 + ax + b , where a, b are in whatever is the appropriate set(rational numbers, complex numbers, integers mod n, etc.), together with a special point O called the point at infinity. Elliptic curves are not ellipses. They are so named because they are described by cubic equations, similar to those used for calculating the circumference of an ellipse. In general, cubic equations for elliptic curves take the form E: y 2 + a 1 xy + a 3 y = x 3 + a 2 x 2 + a 4 x + a 6 where a 1 , a 3 , a 2 , a 4 and a 6 are real numbers that satisfy some simple conditions. If we are working mod p, where p>3 is prime, or if we are working with real, rational, or complex numbers, then simple changes of variables transform the present equation into the form y 2 = x 3 + ax + b. However, if we are working mod 2 or mod 3, or with a finite field of characteristic 2 or 3(that is 1+1=0 or 1+1+1=0), then we need to use the more general form. We begin by looking briefly at elliptic curves defined over the real numbers, because some of the basic concepts are easier to motivate in this setting [3] .
Elliptic Curves Groups over the Reals
Let a, b∈ be constants such that A non-singular elliptic curve is the set E of solutions (x,y)∈ x , then the corresponding elliptic curve is called a singular elliptic curve [3] . 0 b 27 a 4 2 3 = +
Elliptic Curve Addition
Elliptic curve groups are additive groups; that is, their basic function is addition. Suppose E is a non-singular elliptic curve and P,Q∈E, where P=(x 1 ,y ) and Q=(x ,y 2 ). The negative of a point P =(x 1 ,y 1 ) is its reflection in the x-axis: the point -P is (x ,-y 1 ). Notice that for each point P on an elliptic curve, the point -P is also on the curve [3] . i. Adding distinct points P and Q Suppose that P and Q are two distinct points on an elliptic curve, and the P is not -Q. To add the points P and Q, a line(L) is drawn through the two points. This line will intersect the elliptic curve in exactly one more point, call -R. The point -R is reflected in the x-axis to the point R.
The law for addition in an elliptic curve group is P + Q = R where ii. Adding the points P and -P The line through P and -P is a vertical line which does not intersect the elliptic curve at a third point; thus the points P and -P cannot be added as previously. It is for this reason that the elliptic curve group includes the point at infinity O. By definition, P + (-P) = O. As a result of this equation, P + O = P in the elliptic curve group . O is called the additive identity of the elliptic curve group; all elliptic curves have an additive identity [3] .
iii. Doubling the point P To add a point P to itself, a tangent line to the curve is drawn at the point P. If y is not 0, then the tangent line intersects the elliptic curve at exactly one other point, -R. -R is reflected in the x-axis to R. This operation is called doubling the point P; the law for doubling a point on an elliptic curve group is defined by P + P = 2P = R. The slope of L can be computed using implicit differentiation of the equation of 
iv. Doubling the point P if y = 0
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If a point P is such that y =0, then the tangent line to the elliptic curve at P is vertical and does not intersect the elliptic curve at any other point. By definition, 2P = O for such a point P. If one wanted to find 3P in this situation, one can add 2P + P. This becomes P + O = P Thus 3P = P. 3P = P, 4P = O, 5P = P, 6P = O, 7P = P, etc. 
Fig.1. Example of EC Addition
At this point the following properties of the addition operation, as defined above, should be clear:
• addition is closed on the set E, • addition is associative,
Finally define P+O=O+P=P for all P∈E. Note that the addition of points on an elliptic curve over Z does not have the nice geometric interpretation that it does on an elliptic curve over the reals. However; the same formulas can be used to define addition, and the resulting pair (E,+) still forms an abelian group.
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• addition is commutative
• O is an identity with respect to addition, and • Evey point on E has an inverse with respect to addition. In order to show that (E,+) is an abelian group.
A disadvantage of using the real numbers for cryptography, is that it is very hard to store them precisely in computer memory, and to predict how much storage we will need for them. This problem can be solved by using finete fields. i.e. fields with a finite number of elements. Since the number of elements is finite, we can find a unique representation for each of them, which allows us to store and handle the elements in a manageable way. Two types of finite fields are popular for use in Elliptic Curve Cryptography: fields of the form GF(p), with p prime, and fields of the form GF(2 ), with n a positive integer. GF(p) is the same things as Z [3, 4] . 
)-y and P Q = (y - Example 1: 1-) Let P=(4,7) and Q=(13,11). Then P+Q=(x ,y ) is computed as follows: E has 29 points on it. Since any group of prime order is cyclic, it follows that E is isomorphic to Z , and any point other than the point at infinity is a generator of E. Suppose we take the generator α =(4,7). Then we can compute the
29
"powers" of α (which we will write as multiples of α , since the group operation is additive). 2 α =(10,18). The next multiple would be 3 α =2 α + α =(10,18)+(4,7)=(13,11).
Continuing in this fashion, the remaining multiples can be computed to be the following: points on E, which we denote by #E, satisfies the following inequality :
In other words, the order of an elliptic curve E(Zp) is roughly equal to the size p of the underlying field. If p is large , say around 10 , it is infeasible to count the points on an elliptic curve by listing them.
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More sophisticated algorithms have been developed by Schoof, Atkin, Elkies, and others to deal with this problem. Now, given that we can compute #E, we further want to find a cyclic subgroup of E in which the discrete log problem is intractible. So we would like to know something about the structure of the group E.
The following definition gives a considerable amount of information on the group structure of E [3] .
GROUP STRUCTURE: Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Zp, where p is prime, p > 3.
Then there exist integers n1 and n2 such that E is isomorphic to Z xZ . Further; n | n 1 and n | (p -1). Hence, if the integers n 1 and n can be computed, then we know that E has a cyclic subgroup isomorphic to Z , that can potentially be used as a setting for an ElGamal Cryptosystem. Note that if n =1, then E is a cyclic group. Also, if #E is a prime, or the product of distinct primes, then E must be a cyclic groupindexcyclic group. For example; consider the elliptic curve E(Z ) defined above. Since #E(Z )=29, which is prime, E(Z ) is cyclic and any point other than O is a generator of E(Z ). For example, =(4,7) is a generator as shown in example 1. The Shanks and Pohlig-Hellman algorithms apply to the elliptic curve logarithm problem, but there is no known adaptation of the index calculus method to elliptic curves. However, there is a method of exploiting an explicit isomorphism between elliptic curves and finite fields that leads to efficient algorithms for certain classes of elliptic curves. This technique, due to Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone, can be applied to some particular examples within a special class of elliptic curves called supersingular curves that were suggested for use in cryptosystems [5, 6] . If the supersingular curves are avoided, however, then it appears that an elliptic curve having a cyclic subgroup of size 2 will provide a secure setting for a cryptosystem, provided that the order of the subgroup is divisible by at least one large prime factor (again, to guard against a Pohlig-Hellman attack). consists of all points (x,y), x∈F , y∈F , together with a special point O called the point at infinity [7, 8] . In a true cryptographic application, the parameter m must be large enough to preclude the efficient generation of such a table otherwise the cryptosystem can be broken. In today's practice, n = 160 is a suitable choice. The use of generator notation (g e ) rather than bit string notation, as used in the following example. Also, using generator notation allows multiplication without reference to the irreducible polynomial f(x) = x Example 3: Consider the elliptic curve defined in before example 1-) Let P=(g 6 ,g ) and Q=(g ,g ). Then
P+Q=(x ,y ) is computed as follows: x =((g +g )/(g 6 +g )) +( g + g 13 )/( g + g )+ g + g +g =( g /g ) + g /g + g + g +g =1 2-) Let P=(g 6 ,g ). Then 2P=P+P=(x ,y ) is computed as follows:
x =(g 6 ) +(1/(g 6 ) )=g + g =g and y =(g 6 ) +(g + g / g 6 ) g + g = g +g +g 10 = g . Hence 2P=( g 10 , g ). 
ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Elliptic curves versions exist for many cryptosystems, in particular those involving discrete logarithms. An advantage of elliptic curves over working with integers mod p is the following. In the integers, it is possible to use the factorization into primes(especially small primes) to attack the discrete logarithm problem. More specifically, the ECC relies upon the difficulty of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Recall that we examined two geometrically defined operations over certain elliptic curve groups. These two operations were point addition and point doubling. By selecting a point in a elliptic curve group, one can double it to obtain the point 2P.
After that, one can add the point P to the point 2P to obtain the point 3P. The determination of a point nP in this manner is referred to as Scalar Multiplication of a point. The ECDLP is based upon the interactability of scalar multiplication products. Specifically, consider the operation called "scalar multiplication" under additive notation: that is, computing kP by adding together k copies of the point P. Using multiplicative notation, this operation consists of multiplying together k copies of the point P, yielding the point P*P*P*P&.*P = Pk [3, 9] . In the multiplicative group Zp*, the discrete logarithm problem is: given elements r and q of the group, and a prime p, find a number k such that r = qk mod p.
If the elliptic curve groups is described using multiplicative notation, then the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is: given points P and Q in the group, find a number that Pk = Q; k is called the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P. When the elliptic curve group is described using additive notation, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is: given points P and Q in the group, find a number k such that Pk = Q Example 4: In the elliptic curve group defined by y2=x3+9x+17 over F23, What is the discrete logarithm k of Q= (4, 5) to the base P=(16,5) ?
One way to find k is to compute multiples of P until Q is found. Since 9P = (4,5) = Q, the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P is k=9. In a real application, k would be large enough such that it would be infeasible to determine k in this manner.
In the following subsections, three elliptic curve versions of classical algorithms are described [3, 4] .
An Elliptic Curve ElGamal Cryptosystem
ElGamal Cryptosystem : Alice wants to send a message x to Bob, so Bob chooses a large prime Hence, the decryption yields the correct plaintext. There are some practical difficulties in implementing an ElGamal Cryptosystem on an elliptic curve. This system, when implemented in Z (or in GF(p n ) with n > 1) has a message expansion factor of two, An elliptic curve implementation has a message expansion factor of (about) four. This happens since there are approximately p plaintexts, but each ciphertext consists of four field elements. A more serious problem is that the plaintext space consists of the points on the curve E, and there is no convenient method known of deterministically generating points on E. 
Elliptic Curve Menezes-Vanstone Cryptosystem
A more efficient variation has been found by Menezes and Vanstone. In this variation, the elliptic curve is used for "masking," and plaintexts and ciphertexts are allowed to be arbitrary ordered pairs of (nonzero) field elements (i.e., they are not required to be points on E). This yields a message expansion factor of two, the same as in the original ElGamal Cryptosystem.
The Menezes-Vanstone Cryptosystem: Let E be an elliptic curve defined over iz, (p > 3 prime)
such that E contains a cyclic subgroup H in which the discrete log problem is intractible. Cryptosystem allows 20x20=400 plaintexts, as compared 29 in the original system.
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Example 6: As in the previous example, suppose that α =(4,7) and Bob's secret "exponent" is 3, so =3 α =(13,11). β
Suppose Alice wants to encrypt the plaintext x=(9,1) (note that x is not a point on E), and she chooses the random value k=5. First, she computes y 0 =k =5(4,7)=(8,8) and k =5(13,11)=(22,18), so c =22 and c =18.
Next, she calculates y 1 =c 1 x mod p=22x9 mod 23=14, and y =c x mod p=18x1 mod23 = 18. 
Hence, the decryption yields the correct plaintext.
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange: Alice and Bob want to establish a key for communicating. The Diffie-Hellman scheme for accomplishing this is as follows:
• Either Alice or Bob selects a large, secure prime number p and a primitive root (mod p). Both p and α α can be made public.
• Alice chooses a secret random x with 1 ≤ x ≤ p-2, and Bob selects a secret random y with 1 ≤ y ≤ p-2.
• Alice sends (mod p) to Bob, and Bob sends (mod p) to Alice. 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
In 2000, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm(ECDSA) was approved as FIPS 186-2. Let p be a prime or a power of two, and let E be an elliptic curve defined over Z . 
SECURITY OF ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
Because of the apparent difficulty of the ECDLP, highly secure systems can be designed that require much smaller key sizes than RSA or DSA in order to achieve comparable levels of security. ECC demands less resources. On the server, no particular performance need for switching to ECC. In the client, there are good reasons. Table 2 gives approximate parameter sizes for comparable strength elliptic curve systems and RSA. Table 3 gives the key size estimate values of RSA and ECC. This is based on current best techniques for solving the ECDLP and factorising large integers. Consequently, using elliptic curves, we can define highly secure systems that use much smaller keys compared with equivalent "traditional" systems, such as RSA or DSA. In particular, such systems require relatively modest computing capability and memory -ideal, for example, for a smart card or mobile phone [10, 11] . The security of ECC depends on how difficult it is to determine k given kP and P. This referred to as the elliptic curve logarithm problem. The fastest known technique for taking the elliptic curve logarithm is known as the Pollard rho method. Table 4 compares the efficiency of this method with factoring a number into two primes using the general number field sieve. As can be seen, a considerably smaller key size can be used for ECC compared to RSA is. Futhermore, for equal key lengths, the computational effort required for ECC and RSA is comparable. Thus, there is a computational advantage to using ECC with a shorter key length than a comparably secure RSA [10, 11] . 
SOME PROBLEMS AND ISSUES WITH ELLIPTIC CURVE SYSTEMS

Security
The main issue is that the true difficulty of the ECDLP is not fully understood. Recent research has shown that some elliptic curves that were believed suitable for elliptic curve cryptography are in fact not appropriate. For example, if the order of the base point P is equal to the prime p then it turns out that the ECDLP can be solved efficiently [10, 11] .
Curve Generation
When defining an elliptic curve system, a curve and a base point (P) are required. Note that these elements are not secret (and may be the same for all system users). For a given curve and base point, it is trivial to generate public and private keys for users (the private key is simply a random integer k and the public key is the point kP on the curve). The difficulty of the ECDLP means that it is infeasible to deduce the private key from the public key. However, it is an extremely difficult problem to generate a suitable curve and base point in the first place. The main problem is how to count the number of points on the curve. Having done this, it is then necessary to select a suitable base point P, which must have a large order to ensure the difficulty of the ECDLP. But the order of P must divide the number of points on the curve (remember that the points on the curve, together with the point at infinity form a finite group). So, having found the number of points on the curve, it is quite likely that a suitable base point cannot be found.
There are a variety of other restrictions that must be satisfied when generating curves[12].
Incompatible Systems
The "odd" and "even" elliptic curve implementations are similar, but sufficiently different to ensure that an "odd" system will be incompatible with an "even" system. Furthermore, within the even case there are a number of ways to represent curves and base points and a user with a system appropriate for one representation may not be able to communicate successfully with a user with a different representation. This is different to the case of RSA, where (in theory) all implementations are compatible. Ignoring issues of compatibility, there are good reasons to use "even" elliptic curve systems, mainly to do with speed of processing, but here again users need to be wary. A number of experts in this area believe that the ECDLP may be easier to solve for the even case than the odd case, although it must be admitted that the evidence for such assertions is a little flimsy [11, 12] .
Royalties and Patents
The issue of royalties and patents relevant to elliptic curve cryptosystems is somewhat unclear. There are a number of patents in this area, mainly applicable to the even case [10] .
Processing
We have already mentioned that because elliptic curve systems use small key sizes then less computing power is required than for RSA. How does this translate into speed of processing? Table 5 provides comparative figures for RSA and ECDSA (odd case) signature generation and verification, where both algorithms were implemented using two parallel Motorola 56303 Digital Signal Processors (66 MHz). Note that the RSA signature verify figures assume the use of a public exponent e = 65537[12]. 
CONCLUSIONS
Elliptic curve systems are increasingly seen as an alternative to RSA, rather than a replacement. There are potential advantages, especially when used in devices with limited processing capability and/or memory. Typical applications include: -m-commerce (e.g. WAP mobile phone, hand-held devices); -smart card systems (e.g. EMV); -e-commerce and banking applications (e.g. SET); -internet based applications (e.g. SSL) [10, 11, 12] .
